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The Hazardous Waste Abatement
Liability of Innocent Landowners: A
Constitutional Analysis
State and federal statutes that regulate hazardous waste impose
strict liability on the parties directly responsible for the creation of
the waste site.' The liability of these parties is triggered by affirmative
conduct in creating, transporting, or disposing of hazardous waste.'
The California Hazardous Waste Control Act,3 however, like statutes
in other jurisdictions,' goes further than imposing liability merely upon
the creators of hazardous waste sites. The California Act provides
that owners of polluted land also are liable for the cost to the state
of the abatement of the hazardous waste on their land.' Hence, under
California law, the liability of these individuals is based upon the
land ownership rather than upon conduct.6 While placing this liability
upon landowners may promote environmental interests by providing
cleanup funds, this liability also may impose unreasonable hardship
on a party who had nothing to do with creating the waste site. A
recent application of the California abatement statute illustrates this
unfairness.
In 1981, Allan and Rosalie Cooper bought a parcel of rural land
in Auburn, California. The Coopers were unaware that a prior tenant
1. 42 U.S.C. §6973(a); 42 U.S.C. §9607(a), (b); CAL. HEA.TH & SAFETY CODE §25187.5.
See infra notes 93-119, and accompanying text.
2. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25187.5(c). Under this section, liability for costs
of abating hazardous waste sites is imposed upon "operators of the property where the hazar-
dous waste is located and producers, transporters or disposers of hazardous waste." Id. See
also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25100, expressing the legislative finding that "increasing
quantities of hazardous wastes are being generated in the state, for which the generators of
the hazardous waste must provide disposal." Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25167.2, declar-ing that "adequate and reasonable safeguards in handling hazardous waste, particularly in
transporting hazardous wastes to disposal sites, are necessary to protect the public health and
environment." Id. See also United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823, 834 (1984), stating that by promulgating the liability sections in 42 U.S.C. §9607, Con-
gress meant to spread the costs of hazardous waste cleanup to those who created and profited
from the waste disposal, namely generators, transporters, and disposal site owner/operators.
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§25100-25249.
4. See infra notes 93-119, and accompanying text.
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25187, §25187.5(c). In addition to imposing liability
upon operators, producers, transporters, and generators of hazardous waste, these sections apply
to "present and prior owners of the property where hazardous waste is located." Id.
6. Id.
7. See Neary, Toxic Lots, San Fran. Magazine, Sept., 1984.
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had contaminated 2,200 square feet of the land with polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs), chemicals known to cause impotence, gastric
disorders, and other physical damage in humans.' When the previous
tenant could not be found, the California Department of Health Ser-
vices, pursuant to statute, 9 sent the Coopers a bill for $20,000,'0 the
amount the state would incur in cleaning the site." The Coopers were
unable to pay the bill,' 2 and escaped liablity only because a volunteer
effort was organized to clean the land. 3
This author contends that charging innocent landowners 4 with hazar-
dous waste abatement costs also runs counter to provisions of the
United States Constitution, which provide that private property can-
not be taken for a public use without just compensation," and that
no one may be deprived of property without due process of law. 6
These provisions limit the power of the state to compel expenditures
by landowners for public health, safety, or welfare reasons. 7 By
statutorily imposing liability upon innocent landowners for hazardous
waste site abatement, the state unconstitutionally is placing the cost
of public benefits upon individuals. Under the Constitution, liability
for hazardous waste cleanup should be confined to the parties that
create or maintain the waste site.
To reach this conclusion, this author will examine the extent to
which costs can be imposed upon individuals under the police power
of the state to act in furtherance of public health, safety, or welfare.
8. Id.
9. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFE TY CODE §25187. Under this section, the department may
order persons who have violated the statute to clean up the waste site. Additionally, the costs
to the state of cleaning the waste site can be charged to persons who have violated the statute,
including owners of land upon which hazardous waste is located. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§25187.5(c).
10. Neary, supra note 7.
11. Id.
12. The Coopers do not appear able to pay the amount assessed. Mr. Cooper is employed
by a beer wholesaler; Mrs. Cooper worked as a clerk in a Salvation Army Thrift Store. Id.
13. Sacramento Bee, Sept. 26, 1984, at BI, B2, col. 1-3. The volunteers, who were organized
by Mr. Joel Moscowitz of the California Department of Health Services, were also employees
of the department. Id.
14. An innocent landowner is defined, for the purposes of this comment, to be an owner
or occupier of land upon which hazardous waste is located, who did not by any affirmative
act help to create or maintain the waste site. This definition of liability is similar to the state-
ment of landowner liability for public nuisances in the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth
v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 353 A.2d 471, 478 (1976).
15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, which provides in part: "nor shall private property be taken
for a public use, without just compensation." Id. This provision has been held applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago B. &
0. R. Co. v. Chicago 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
16. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, §1, which provides: "nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of.. .property, without due process of law." Id.
17. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1959).
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This discussion will demonstrate that, under the police power, inno-
cent landowners cannot be held responsible for the costs of abating
hazardous waste on their land. Since environmental regulations basically
are codifications of the common law of public nuisance, 8 and because
this area of common law often is considered in cases involving the
limits on the power of the state to regulate land use,' 9 the respon-
sibility of a landowner for public nuisances will be discussed. Finally,
a conflict of law existing among jurisdictions regarding the ability
of the state to require innocent landowners to correct hazardous waste
deposits on their land will be explored. Since this conflict involves
differing views of the extent of the police power,20 the limits on this
power is an appropriate subject with which to begin discussion.
THm POLICE POWER TO ABATE WASTE SITES
The police power of the state has been described as all actions
necessary to promote public health, safety, and welfare. 2' Courts have
recognized that necessary state actions can affect property interests
incidentally and cause substantial losses to individuals without requiring
compensation by the state.22 Most zoning ordinances are examples
of valid exercises of the police power that affect property interests.2 3
Imposing liability upon an innocent landowner for the cost of abating
a hazardous waste site also is an exercise of the police power.24
Although subject to great judicial deference,2 5 an exercise of the
police power affecting property rights must comport with the con-
stitutional prohibition against the taking of private property for a
public use without just compensation.26 The United States Supreme
Court has held this prohibition to be applicable to the states under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 27 The policy of
18. CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com., 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 318-19,
118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324 (1974).
19. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 639 (1887); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
20. See notes 21-87, 121-248 and accompanying text.
21. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
22. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), in which the United
States Supreme Court recognized that: "Government could hardly go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change..."
Id. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions involving the taking issue, see Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1977).
23. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 390-97 (1926).
24. See generally National Wood Preservers v. Commw., Etc., 414 A.2d 37, 42-48 (Pa.
1980) (discussing whether a statute imposing abatement liability upon innocent landowners is
a valid exercise of police power).
25. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 140 (1894).
26. Id. at 136-37.
27. Chicago B. & 0. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
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the taking clause is that government should be barred from forcing
individuals to bear the costs of public benefits."8 Thus, when prop-
erty is taken for a public purpose, the costs of the property must
be spread among the public through the payment of compensation
to the property owner by the state. 9 In the context of hazardous
waste cases, the issue becomes whether the Constitution allows the
cost of abatement to be fixed upon an innocent landowner, rather
than spreading the cost to the public.3"
The Supreme Court of the United States has had difficulty
establishing a test to determine the validity of actions taken under
the police power that affect property interests. 3' In the early case of
Mugler v. Kansas,3" the Court recognized that many police power
actions resulting in substantial interference with property interests are
nonetheless constitutional.33 In Mugler, a statute that prohibited the
manufacture of intoxicating liquors within the state substantially
destroyed the value of a brewery owned by the plaintiff.34 In deter-
mining the validity of the statute, the Court focused on the nature
of the state action, noting that the state must assert a proprietary
interest in the property involved before a taking can occur." Since
the state had not asserted a proprietary interest in the brewery of
the plaintiff, a taking had not occurred.36
The Mugler Court, by emphasizing the character of the state action,
refused to find that the loss to the individual could justify invalidating
a state action affecting property rights.37 Nonetheless, the Court soon
began to consider the extent of individual loss, in addition to the
nature of the state action, when confronted with cases involving tak-
ing issues.38 This was recognized by the Court in a two-pronged test
for determining the validity of state actions interfering with private
28. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1959).
29. Id.; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922). In this
opinion, Justice Holmes wrote: "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant acheiving the desire in other than
the constitutional way of paying for the change." Id. at 416.
30. See Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commw., 387 A.2d 142, 149-50 (1978).
31. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
The Court stated: "The question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty.. .this Court, quite simply, has been
unable to develop any 'set formula' . . . for use in determining what is a taking." Id.
32. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
33. Id. at 655.
34. Id. at 667.
35. Id. at 667-69.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 664-67.
38. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137, 140-41 (1893).
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property announced in Lawton v. Steele.39 In Lawton, the Court stated:
To justify the state in thus interposing its authority on behalf of
the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public...
require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 40
The first prong of this test requires the state action to be in the
public interest.4 In reviewing the purposes involved in a state action,
however, the Court has given great deference to the determination
of a state legislature that the action is in the public interest. 42 In the
context of hazardous waste abatement, this author concedes that the
state validly can provide for the abatement of hazardous waste sites
since this action is necessary to protect public health and the environ-
ment. For this reason, this author will focus on the second prong
of the Lawton test, which requires that the means used in a police
power action be reasonably related to the accomplishment of the state
purpose without being unduly oppressive to individuals.43
In cases following Lawton, the United States Supreme Court has
been inconsistent when deciding whether the means used in a police
action are reasonably related to the state purpose. Nonetheless, the
decisions repeatedly have considered both the character of the state
action emphasized in Mugler, and the extent of the loss incurred by
the individual, the consideration embodied in the second prong of
Lawton.45 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,4 the Court indicated
that the likelihood that a taking will be found increases with the extent
of diminution in property value occasioned by the state action. 47 Thus,
the state action in that case, by destroying the value of the property,
was invalid as unduly oppressive on the individual.48
The Court again considered the effect individual loss will have in
39. Id.
40. Id. at 140.
41. Id.
42. Id..
43. Id. at 137.
44. See, e.g., Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Laws, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 63, 63-64, 105-06.
45. See generally Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964). The author
discusses the history in Supreme Court decisions of both the character of the state action test
and the diminution in value test. Id. at 36-46.
46. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
47. Id. at 413, 415-16.
48. Id. at 414.
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determining the validity of state interferences with property rights in
Pennsylvania Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York. 9 In that case,
the Court identifed the economic impact of the state action on the
individual, as well as the character of the government action, as fac-
tors of particular significance in determining whether the means used
by the state are reasonably necessary to achieve the state purpose." °
The Penn Central opinion also indicates that in determining the validity
of state action, the court must balance the importance and necessity
of the action against the resulting individual loss." Thus, a great
necessity for the action taken under the police power will justify even
a great loss upon the individual.52
Before applying these rules to the question of innocent owner liability
in hazardous waste cases, an additional factor for determining the
validity of state interferences with property interests must be discussed.
This factor is the relationship between acts of the individual and the
condition the state seeks to correct. The losses occasioned by the state
action in Penn Central and Mugler involved a diminution in prop-
erty value.53 In contrast, a regulation imposing hazardous waste abate-
ment liability requires an expenditure by the individual.54 The Court,
in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters," found that a state-required
expenditure may be invalid if the party assessed did not cause the
condition that the state action was intended to correct. 56
The Nashville decision followed a line of cases involving the issue
of whether the state could require a railroad to pay for the building
of an underpass where automobile traffic crossed railroad tracks."
Generally, the Court had upheld these assessments on the rationale
that since the railroad created a danger to automobile traffic that
was in need of correction, the state could impose the costs of the
correction upon the railroad.58 In Nashville, however, the Court found
error in the refusal of the state supreme court to consider evidence
49. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
50. Id. at 124. The focus upon the economic impact upon the individual takes into account
more than the diminution in the value of real estate, since the Court pointed out that the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with "distinct investment-backed expectations"
is a particularly relevant consideration in determining if a regulation is unconstitutional. Id.
51. Id. at 135-36.
52. Id.
53. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-27; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 667 (1887).
54. See CAL. HEALTH & SAF=r CODE §25187.
55. 294 U.S. 405 (1934). See also Dunham, supra note 44, at 73-81.
56. Nashville, 294 U.S. 405, 429.
57. Id. See Sax, supra note 45 at 48-49; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police
Power: the Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 48-51 (1971).
58. Nashville, 294 U.S. at 429-30.
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showing that a federal road building plan, rather than the activity
of the railroad, 59 would cause increased traffic. The Court stated that
"when particular individuals are singled out to bear the cost of ad-
vancing the public convenience, that imposition must bear some
reasonable relation to the evils to be eradicated or the advantages
to be secured. ' ' 6" Hence, under Nashville, a person must have created
a condition before being required by the state to alleviate the
condition. 6' To support this ruling, the Court cited precedents which
held that tax assessments for public improvements such as sidewalks
are constitutional only if the assessments reflect the particular benefits
that the improvements confer upon the parties assessed. 62
When applied to a state requirement that an innocent landowner
pay to abate a hazardous waste site, Nashville indicates that mere
ownership of land does not justify placing this cost upon the
individual.63 Instead, some conduct of the individual in creating or
maintaining the waste site is required.6 Buttressing this conclusion
is the citation in Nashville to tax assessment cases. The reference to
these-cases indicates the possibility that in a hazardous waste case
only the amount of value added to the land by the cleanup could
be imposed on the landowner.6 5 This amount is likely to be far dif-
ferent from the cost of the cleanup. 6
Nashville, which involved a state required expenditure to correct
a condition on land, seems analogous to hazardous waste abatement
cases that similarly require payment for the correction of conditions
on land. 67 Nonetheless, cases that have considered whether the statutory
imposition of waste abatement liability upon innocent landowners meets
the Lawton requirement that the means used in the state action not
be unduly oppressive upon individuals, have relied on cases like Penn.
Coal Co. and Penn Central, rather than Nashville, when determining
this question." Unfortunately, aside from involving taking issues, these
59. Id. at 413-29.
60. Id. at 429.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The Nashville Court refused to find that ownership of land alone justified compelling
the landowner to pay for correcting a condition on the land. See id. at 412-15, 429.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 430 (the Court stated that: "so-called assessments for public improvements
laid upon particular property owners are ordinarily constitutional only if based on benefits
received by them").
66. For an analysis of the costs involved in cleaning a hazardous waste site, see Note:
Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HAutv. L. Ray. 584, 585-87 (1981).
67. Nashville, 294 U.S. at 412-15, 429.
68. See, e.g., Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commw., 387 A.2d 142, 148-50 (Pa.
Commw. 1978); National Wood Preservers v. Commw., Etc. 414 A.2d 37, 43-47 (Pa. 1980).
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decisions are not analogous to cases involving hazardous waste abate-
ment liability because the losses involved in the former cases came
about through diminution in the value of real property rather than
through a required expenditure. 9 Furthermore, losses resulting from
diminution in the value of real property caused by an exercise of the
police power often are classified as only incidental to an exercise of
the police power." Unless these losses are of a great magnitude, the
exercise of the police power is likely to be found valid because the
loss is merely the incidental consequence of a lawful state act."' In
a case involving the statutorily imposed duty to abate a hazardous
waste site, however, a required expenditure, rather than a diminution
in property value, is involved. For this reason, reference to cases in
which a diminution in property value is balanced against the state
purpose is of limited usefulness.7" Nashville, on the other hand,
indicates that the conduct of the party required to make an expen-
diture must be rationally related to the condition the state seeks to
correct."' In the context of hazardous waste regulation, this relation-
ship is found in cases in which liability is imposed upon generators,
transporters, and disposers of hazardous waste, since these parties
caused the harm that the government seeks to correct."' The relation-
ship, however, is not present in cases that impose liability upon a
landowner who did not contribute to the creation of the waste site.
As in Nashville, owning land is insufficient to trigger liability for cor-
recting a condition on land.75
Other considerations support the finding that the imposition of
69. Cf. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982). In this case, which
involved a lien ordinance statute which was held to unconstitutionally destroy pre-existing
creditors' rights in property, the Court noted that since the governmental action would result
in a complete destruction of the plaintiff's property right, the case . . . "would fit but awkwardly
into the analytic framework employed in Penn Central." Id. at 75.
70. Property is said to be held subject to the police power, so that values incident to
property can be diminished to some extent by exercises of the police power. See Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
71. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
72. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 53-66 and accompanying text.
74. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984). In this case, the court stated: "It is clear that Congress intended to have
the chemical industry, past and present, pay for the costs of cleaning up inactive hazardous
waste sites (citations omitted). Congress rationally considered the imposition of liability for
the effects of past disposal practices as a means to spread the costs of the cleanup on those
who created and profited from the waste disposal-generators, transporters, and disposal site
owner/operators." Id. at 840-41.
75. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.v. Commonwealth, 387 A.2d 142, 149-50 (Pa. Commw.
1978); National Wood Preservers v. Commw., 414 A.2d 37, 47-48 (concurring opinion) (Pa. 1980).
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hazardous waste liability upon innocent landowners is not sufficiently
related to the state purpose and thus unconstitutional. The abatement
of hazardous waste sites is undoubtedly an important governmental
activity, because these sites threaten to contaminate drinking water
and the environment.76 The response to this problem has been
hampered by a shortage of funds." Unavailability of financial resources
alone, however, cannot justify placing the cost of a government ac-
tivity upon an individual.7" Instead, the recognition that state and
federal funds are inadequate to abate the hazardous waste sites spread
throughout the country necessitates asking whether the costs of cleaning
these sites should be placed upon the public or upon individuals. In
abating the waste sites, the government plainly is acting for the benefit
of the public." Thus, before the costs of this activity constitutionally
can be placed upon property owners, these individuals should be related
to the condition the government seeks to remedy by more than mere
land ownership."0
In addition to considering the relationship between the state pur-
pose and the means used to achieve that purpose, the Penn Central
and Lawton cases indicate that the financial impact of the action upon
the individual is also an important consideration."1 Hazardous waste
abatement is expensive." The cost of cleaning a small site often is
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and the cost of abating a large
site often reaches several million dollars.8 3 Fixing these costs on a
party who did not contribute to the creation of the site would seem
unduly oppressive.
In considering whether placing these costs upon individuals is an
invalid exercise of the police power, however, courts often have referred
to the common law of public nuisance." While the law of nuisance
76. See 42 U.S.C. §6901(b) (stating the Congressional finding that unsafe hazardous waste
disposal practices contaminate "drinking water from underground and surface supplies").
77. See Cleaning Up Toxic Sites, U.S. News & World Rep., Sept. 10, 1984, p. 70; Frankel,
Hazardous Waste Control: Report on Reports, 25 ENVIRONMENT July/August 1983, at 25-26.
78. The reason for prohibiting the taking of private property for a public use is to bar
the government from imposing the costs of public benefits upon individuals. Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1959).
79. See 42 U.S.C. §6902. This section states the Congressional objective in regulating solid
waste disposal to be "to promote the protection of health and the environment and to conserve
valuable material and energy resources . . ." Id.
80. Nashville, 294 U.S. 405, 429-30 (1934).
81. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
82. See Note, supra note 66, at 585-87.
83. Id.
84. See Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commw., 387 A.2d 142, 149-50 (Pa. Commw.
1978).
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does not control the determination of this constitutional question,"
refering to liability for other types of public nuisances is helpful in
ascertaining the extent to which a state may interfere with property
interests pursuant to the police power." Similar analogies may be
drawn from statutory impositions of liability for the abatement of
public nuisances.8 7 A discussion of abatement liability under the com-
mon law and statutes, therefore, is necessary to determine the con-
stitutionality of a statute imposing hazardous waste abatement liability
upon an innocent landowner.
LIABILITY FOR PUBLIC NUISANCES
Environmental statutes imposing liability for hazardous waste abate-
ment essentially are codifications of the law of public nuisance." Thus,
courts often refer to nuisance law in deciding the liability of parties
in hazardous waste cases. 9 Under common law, an action can be
brought by the state to abate a use of land that injures public health,
safety, or welfare. 9 The state also has authority, subject to constitu-
tional limitations, to declare land uses to be public nuisances, and
to provide for their abatement. 91
A number of statutes provide for the abatement of hazardous waste
sites. 92 A brief examination of these statutes is necessary to establish
the liability these statutes impose upon innocent landowners. A com-
parison then will be made between the statutory liability for waste
sites and the abatement liability of landowners for public nuisances
at common law and under other statutes to demonstrate that the im-
position of abatement liability upon innocent landowners is not sup-
ported by the law of public nuisance.
85. Cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926) (stating that
the law of nuisance may be consulted to help determine the validity of an exercise of the police
power that affects property interests).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
89. See Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 387 A.2d 142, 149-50 (Pa.
Commw. 1978); National Wood Preservers v. Commw., 414 A.2d 37, 45-47 (Pa. 1980);
Environmental Protection Dep't. v. Ventron Corp., 440 A.2d 455, 463-64 (N.J. Super. A.D.
1981); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., Etc., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1132-42 (D. Conn.
1980); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 831-39 (Ill. 1981); Note,
Successor Landowner Liability for Environmental Torts: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?, 13 RUTGERS
L. J. 329, 330 (1982).
90. See City of Turlock v. Bristow, 103 Cal. App. 750, 752, 284 P. 962, 963 (1930).
91. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915): City of Bakersfield v. Miller,
64 Cal.2d 93, 98-100, 410 P.2d 393, 397-98, 48 Cal. Rptr. 889, 893-94 (1966).
92. See 42 U.S.C. §6973(a), (b); 42 U.S.C. §9606(a), §9607(a); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §25187, §25187.5; MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. Ch. 21E, §5.
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1. Statutory Imposition of Hazardous Waste Abatement Liability
Many of the statutes regulating hazardous waste disposal impose
cleanup liability upon innocent landowners. 93 The first federal statute
enacted as a response to hazardous waste disposal problems was the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976(RCRA). 9" RCRA
primarily addresses the current generation and disposal of hazardous
waste" and, therefore, assigns liability for improper waste disposal
to the parties causing the problem, namely, the creators and disposers
of hazardous waste. 96 Nonetheless, a key RCRA provision also applies
to innocent landowners. 97 The imminent hazard provision of RCRA98
permits the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to take necessary
action to abate a waste site presenting an imminent danger to public
health or to the environment. 99 This provision has been interpreted
to allow the imposition of abatement liability based solely upon land
ownership.' 0
Congress and the EPA considered RCRA inadequate in dealing with
the problem of inactive or abandoned hazardous waste sites because
no funds were provided for use in abating waste sites' and because
early federal court decisions interpreting the imminent hazard provi-
sion held the provision not to have retroactive application.0 2 For these
reasons, Congress passed the Comprehensive Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).' °3 Also known as the Super-
fund legislation, CERCLA provides funds for the EPA to use in
abating hazardous waste sites. 0 The fund, which originally amounted
to $1.6 billion, is composed of fees imposed on the oil and chemical
industries and additional federal monies.'
Two provisions in CERCLA apply to innocent landowners. One
93. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
94. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6987.
95. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1431 (S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1984).




100. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1073 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd 688 F.2d 204
(3d Cir. 1982).
101. See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1984); S.
Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), H.R. No. 1016 (Part I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
25 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119, 6125; see also 45 Fed. Reg.
33,170 (1980) (statement by EPA interpreting RCRA imminent hazard provision, due to use
of present tense in the statute, not to apply to inactive hazardous waste sites).
102. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1437 (S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1984).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657.
104. Id. §9611.
105. Id. §9631.
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provision allows the EPA to undertake necessary abatement actions,' 06
and another fixes liability for waste site abatement.' 0 7 Liability is
assigned to owners of a "facility" 08 containing hazardous waste that
requires cleanup. Since the term "facility" is defined to include any
land upon which hazardous waste is located,' 0 9 the owner of such
land might be held liable for the costs of abating the waste."10
Although RCRA and CERCLA impose hazardous waste abatement
liability upon innocent landowners, most federal cases involving hazar-
dous waste have involved generators, transporters, or disposers of
hazardous waste rather than innocent landowners."' The federal courts
have not considered the constitutionality of applying these statutes
to innocent landowners." 2 State courts, however, which have handled
more cases involving the waste abatement liability of innocent land-
owners, have considered the constitutionality of innocent owner liability
under state hazardous waste statutes." 3 States have passed or amended
laws to comply with federal standards and, as a result, state statutes
sometimes reflect the federal assignment of liability upon innocent
landowners."' Although worded differently than the federal statutes," '
the California statute similarly imposes abatement liability on owners
of land upon which hazardous waste is sited."16 Statutes in other states
vary from the federal scheme. The New Jersey statute, for example,
provides that "responsible" parties are liable for cleanup costs of
hazardous waste sites." 7 This term has been interpreted to include
only those parties who, by affirmative conduct, created or maintain-
ed the waste site." 8
106. Id. §9606(a).
107. Id. §9607(a), (b), (c).
108. Id. §9606(a), §9607(a).
109. Id. §9601(9).
110. Id. §9606(a), §9607(a).
111. See U.S. v. Solvents Recovery Service of New York, 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (D.C.
Conn. 1980); U.S. v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (D.C. Minn.
1982); U.S. v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D.C. Ark. 1980); U.S. v. Midwest
Solvents Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 139-42 (D.C. Ind. 1980).
112. See infra 22848 notes and accompanying text.
113. Philadelphia Chewing Gum, Corp. v. Commw., 387 A.2d 142, 148-50 (Pa. Commw.
1978); National Wood Preservers v. Commw., 414 A.2d 37, 42-48 (Pa. Commw. 1980).114. Compare MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 21E, §5 (imposing liability upon "the owner
or operator of a vessel or a site" where hazardous waste is located) with 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(1)(imposing liability upon "the owner or operator of a vessel or a facility" where waste is located).
115. Compare 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (subjecting "the owner and operator of ... a facility" to
liability for hazardous waste abatement costs) with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETr CODE §25187.5(in which abatement liability is imposed upon "present and prior owners, lessees, or operators
of the property where the hazardous waste is located").
116. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§25187, 25187.5.
117. N.J. STAT. ANN. §58:10-23.11g(b),(c).
118. See infra notes 193-227 and accompanying text.
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Thus, federal statutes, and the statutes of some states, including
California, allow the imposition of hazardous waste abatement costs
upon innocent landowners. Courts, when asked to determine the con-
stitutionality of these statutory impositions, have considered the extent
to which landowners are liable for public nuisances other than hazar-
dous waste sites. 1 9 Therefore, a determination of the extent to which
a landowner is responsible for the abatement of a public nuisance
at common law and under statute is necessary for an understanding
of how a court may rule when faced with a challenge by an innocent
landowner to a hazardous waste abatement statute.
2. Common Law and Statutory Assignments of Abatement
Liability
When considering the extent of landowner abatement liability for
hazardous waste, a court will inquire whether landowners are under
a duty to abate a public nuisance'20 on their land, regardless of the
cost to the landowner. This duty could be employed by the court
to justify the imposition of waste abatement costs upon innocent
landowners.' 2 ' Thus, the extent to which an owner of land is under
a duty to abate nuisances on the land must be determined. A duty
of this type can be derived from the common law or statutory nuisance
controls.
The law of nuisance is premised upon the idea that the rights of
one person cannot be used in a manner that interferes with the rights
of another.' When this interference occurs, liability in nuisance
arises.' 3 As a general rule, common law responsibility for a nuisanceflows from the acts of the person in creating the nuisance," ' or from
an affirmative act of compounding the nuisance. 25 Within this general
119. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commw., Etc. 387 A.2d 142, 149-50 (Pa. Commw.
1978).
120. Id.
121. Cf. Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Cons. Etc. Comm., 153 Cal. App.3d 605,
200 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1984). The court found that a common law duty of landowners to abate
public nuisances on their land supported a state order that a landowner remove unauthorized
fill material on the land. Id. at 622, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 585-86.
122. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Ex Parte Smith and Keating,
38 Cal. 702, 705-06 (1869).
123. Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 55 N.E.2d 724, 727 (1944).
124. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts, §87 at 574 (4th Ed. 1971), stating: "Today liability
for nuisance may rest upon intentional invasion of the plaintiff's interest, or a negligent one,
or conduct which is abnormal and out of place with its surroundings, and so falls fairly within
the principle of strict liability." Id.
125. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §834 (1977). This section states that "one is subject
to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity, not only when he carries on the activity but
also when he participates to a substantial extent in carrying it on." Id.
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framework, common law and the Restatement of Torts state that a
possessor of land is responsible for harmful artificial conditions on
the land.'26 The duty does not extend to conditions that are not suscep-
tible of abatement by reasonable means. 7
Nonetheless, an examination of case law reveals that courts are reluc-
tant to impose abatement liability upon landowners who did not create
or maintain the nuisance. For example, at common law the landowner
was not responsible for nuisances occurring naturally upon the land.'
Courts also have been reluctant to impose liability when the nuisance
was created by strangers or trespassers. 29 In Brown v. McAllister,'3
a landowner sued his uphill neighbor for nuisance when sewage passed
from the neighbor's land and damaged a building upon plaintiff's
land.' The California Supreme Court found that the neighbor could
not be held liable since the sewage merely had passed over his land
after being discharged from a lot still further up the hill.'32 Thus,
the neighbor could not be held liable because he did not cause the
nuisance. 133
While a landowner is under a limited duty to correct harmful
artificial conditions on the land, statutes often expand this liability
by requiring expenditures for which the landowner would not have
been liable at common law.'34 A statute of this type was challenged
as unconstitutional in Thain v. City of Palo Alto.' The statute in
Thain provided that if the landowner failed to abate weeds thought
to be a fire hazard by city officials, a city employee could enter the
land and destroy the weeds.' 36 The city then could recoup the costs
126. Id. §839.
127. Id. at comment f. This comment states that: "the law does not require the unreasonable
or fantastic, and therefore even though it might conceivably be possible to abate a particular
condition, it is not 'abatable' within the meaning of this section unless its abatement can be
accomplished without unreasonable hardship or expense." Id.
128. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §840 (1977).
129. See id. §838; Brown v. McAllister, 39 Cal. 573, 575-76 (1870).




134. See Thain v. City of Palo Alto, 207 Cal. App. 2d 173, 177-80, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515,
517-18 (1962) (landowners required to abate weeds on their land); Queenside Hills Realty Co.
v. SaxI, 328 U.S. 80, 81-82 (1946) (owners of boarding houses required to install automatic
sprinklers); People v. Greene, 264 Cal. App. 2d 774, 776-78, 70 Cal. Rptr. 818, 819-21
(1968) (owner of land required to fill excavations).
135. 207 Cal. App. 2d 173, 177, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515, 517 (1962): see also People v. Lim,
18 Cal. 2d 872, 877 (1941) (explaining that the ability of the legislature to define as public
nuisances activities that were not nuisances at common law and to provide for their abatement
is used as a means of enforcing public policy).
136. Thain at 177-78, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
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from the landowner.'37 Under this authority, a city employee destroyed
weeds on private property, and the owner of the property was charg-
ed $64.48.' 38 The court upheld the imposition of this cost as a valid
exercise of the police power. 39 Hence, under Thain, the state can
statutorily expand the common law duty of landowners to abate
nuisances on the land.
People v. Greene'40 is another California case involving a statutorily
imposed abatement duty upon a landowner.' 4' In Greene, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal stated that the cause of a harmful condition
upon the land generally is immaterial, 142 because "it is the existence
of the condition rather than its cause which determines the
nuisance."' 43 Thus, once a nuisance had been created, the state could
compel landowners to make their property safe. 44 The court re-
cognized, however, that a statutorily imposed abatement duty was
constitutionally limited to the expenditure of amounts that were
reasonable in relation to the public health or safety interest being
protected. '4 Since the landowner failed to establish the costs of abating
the nuisance, however, the court decided that the issue of excessive
costs was irrevelant and, therefore, upheld the statute.'4 6
In Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation, Etc.
Commission, '41 however, a California court allowed great expense to
be statutorily imposed upon a landowner.' 48 The statute 49 required
the obtaining of a permit from the San Francisco Bay Conservation
Commission (hereinafter referred to as Commission) before fill material
could be placed on land abutting San Francisco Bay.' 50 In violation
of the statute, an unknown person placed landfill material on land
owned by Leslie Salt Co. 5 '
The Commission ordered Leslie Salt to remove the fill, to which
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 191-92, 24 Cal. Rptr. 526.
140. 264 Cal. App. 2d 774, 70 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1968).
141. Id. at 776, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
142. Id. at 778, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 780, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
146. Id.
147. 153 Cal. App. 3d 605, 200 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1984).
148. The state estimated the cost imposed upon the landowner to be $60,500, but Leslie
Salt placed the cost at $100,000. Id. at 610, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
149. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§66600-66661.
150. Id. §66632.
151. Leslie Salt, 153 Cal. App. 3d at 609-11, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
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order Leslie Salt objected.' 52 In upholding the order of the Commis-
sion, the court stated that at common law responsibility for condi-
tions on the land flow directly from the "very possession and control
of the land in question."'' 53 The court, however, did not consider the
constitutionality of imposing large abatement costs upon the
landowner.' 4 Thus, the court did not decide whether the abatement
cost in the case, although large, was a reasonable cost to impose on
the landowner. If Leslie Salt is harmonized with the holding in Greene
that the abatement duty of landowners is limited to the expenditure
of reasonable amounts, then the two cases stand for the proposition
that under California law a statute can impose a duty upon landowners,
based solely on land ownership, to spend reasonable amounts to abate
nuisances on their land.
The Leslie Salt decision that abatement liability can be based upon
landownership under the common law, however, is inconsistent with
the result in Brown, in which the California Supreme Court refused
to hold an innocent landowner responsible for abating a nuisance
caused by another.15 Furthermore, a case from another jurisdiction
indicates that under the common law, abatement liability does not
arise from landownership alone.'5 6 Commonwealth v. Barnes &
Tucker,'57 a Pennsylvania case, involved the discharge of acid drainage
from an inactive coal mine owned by the defendant.' 8 The Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated that owners of land cannot
be held to abate nuisances on their land unless they had helped create
or maintain the nuisance.' 5 9 Thus, the common law is unclear on the
question of whether abatement liability for nuisances created by third
parties can be imposed on the basis of land ownership.
In summary, the common law acknowledges a deviation from the
general rule that liability for nuisance derives from the act of creating
or maintaining a nuisance,'6 and holds that a landowner can be sub-
jected to reasonable liability for nuisances occurring on land in the
possession of the landowner.' 6' A statute enacted pursuant to the police
152. Id.
153. Id. at 622, 200 Cal. Rptr. 586.
154. Id. at 583, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
155. Brown, 39 Cal. at 575-76.
156. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker, 353 A.2d 471, 478 (1976).
157. 353 A.2d 471 (1976).
153. Id. at 476-78.
159. Id. The court, however, held that by creating the condition, the defendants had become
responsible for abatement of the drainage. Id. at 478-80.
160. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 134-59 and accompanying text.
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power can expand this landowner liability to reasonable abatement
efforts for conditions upon the land for which the landowner was
not responsible at common law.162 If a statute requires great expen-
ditures by the landowner or imposes costs for public benefits, the
police power authority for the statute is weakened and the require-
ment may be unconstitutional.' 63 Moreover, the Brown decision in-
dicates a judicial reluctance to impose common law nuisance abate-
ment liability on landowners for nuisances created by other parties. 161
Finally, although a conflict exists over whether landowner liability
derives from ownership of land or from conduct in creating the
nuisance,'65 California cases hold the abatement liability to be inci-
dent to ownership. 66
Applying these rules to a case involving the statutory requirement
that an innocent landowner abate hazardous waste, a California court
is likely to follow the Leslie Salt and Greene cases and hold that the
landowner may be required to make reasonable expenditures to abate
the waste. A different result, however, easily could be reached in a
case before the California Supreme Court if the court applies Brown
and the rationale of cases from other jurisdictions to decide the issue
of innocent owner liability. An examination of hazardous waste deci-
sions in jurisdictions other than California, therefore, is necessary.
HAzARnDous WASTE DECISIONS
Although the issue has not been resolved in California, 67 the extent
to which an innocent landowner can be held liable for hazardous waste
abatement costs has been determined in other jurisdictions with vary-
ing results. In Pennsylvania, a state supreme court decision indicates
that innocent landowners can be held liable for hazardous waste abate-
ment on the basis of land ownership.' 68 In New Jersey, on the other
hand, the landowner must contribute affirmatively to the creation or
maintenance of the waste site before liability is triggered.' 69 Finally,
at least one federal case has held owners of polluted land to be liable
under federal law because of land ownership.' 71 Since the reasoning
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 120-59 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
167. See Neary, supra note 7, and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 171-92 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 193-227 and accompanying text.
170. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1073 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd 688 F.2d 204
(3d Cir. 1982). See infra notes 228-48 and accompanying text.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
in these decisions may provide persuasive authority for a California
court confronted with the issue of innocent owner liability in a hazar-
dous waste case, these cases will be discussed in the following sections.
1. Pennsylvania Cases
Pennsylvania has enacted legislation that, like the statute in
California,' 7' imposes strict liability on landowners for the abatement
of hazardous waste on their land.'" This statute was applied in
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Co. v. Commonwealth,'73 in which lan-
downers leased a portion of their property to a business, National
Wood Preservers, which dumped chemicals into a well on the leased
land.'74 The chemicals leaked into surrounding property used by a
gas station and a chewing gum company.' 71 In addition to ordering
National Wood and the lessors of the property to abate the pollu-
tion, a state agency'16 imposed liability upon the gas station and the
chewing gum company.1' Since the latter two parties did nothing to
create the nuisance, the agency imposed liability on them based on
land ownership alone.' 78 The decision of the state agency was appeal-
ed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which refused to im-
pose liability upon all the defendants."' The court held that impos-
ing liability on the basis of land ownership alone would be to employ
means that, under the Lawton test, would be unduly oppressive upon
individuals "' and hence unconstitutional. To be constitutional, the
abatement liability of an innocent landowner for hazardous waste must
be based upon conduct as well as land ownership.' 8' Thus, the lessors
of the waste site were liable due to their conduct of accepting rent
when they should have known of the dumping." 2 National Wood also
was liable as the creator of the waste site.' 83 The possessors of
neighboring properties, however, could not be held liable for abate-
ment in the absence of conduct adding to the pollution. "'
171. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25187.5.
172. 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. §691.316 (1970).
173. 387 A.2d 142 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
174. Id. at 144-46.
175. Id.
176. The state agency was the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. Id.
at 144.
177. Id. at 148.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 148-52.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 150.
182. Id. at 152.
183. Id. at 151.
184. Id. at 150-51.
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National Wood and the land lessors appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in National Wood Preservers v. Commonwealth.' 5
Although the lower court had imposed liability due to the conduct
of these parties in contributing to the creation of the waste site,'"6
the appellants claimed that the liability was based solely upon land
ownership and, therefore, was unduly oppressive.' 87 The supreme court,
while affirming the lower court decision, held that the abatement liabili-
ty could be based solely upon ownership of the land where the con-
dition was located without being unduly oppressive. 8 The court found
that the validity of an exercise of the police power does not depend
upon the responsibility of the owner for the condition the state is
seeking to correct.189 The State appealed the lower court decision that
the gas company and the chewing gum company could not be held
liable absent a showing that they had contributed to the pollution.
This appeal was dismissed without explanation in the majority
opinion.'9
A concurring opinion helps to explain this inconsistency by indicating
that despite language to the contrary in the majority opinion, the deci-
sion of the court to impose liability was based upon the conduct of
the parties as well as land ownership.' 9' The concurring opinion then
noted that imposing liability based solely upon land ownership would
be to employ unconstitutionally oppressive means under the test in
Lawton v. Steele. 9 Thus, read in light of the concurring opinion,
the National Wood decision holds that a landowner must act affir-
matively to create or maintain the waste site before landowner abate-
ment liability can be constitutionally imposed. An examination of New
Jersey hazardous waste abatement cases reveals that New Jersey courts
have reached a similar result.
2. New Jersey Cases
Like Pennsylvania, the New Jersey courts that have considered lan-
downer abatement liability in hazardous waste cases have focused upon
the conduct of the landowner in creating or maintaining the waste
site as a basis for imposing liability.1 93 The New Jersey hazardous
185. 414 A.2d 37 (Pa. 1980).
186. Philadelphia Chewing Gum, 387 A.2d at 148-50.
187. National Wood Preservers, 414 A.2d at 45.
188. Id. at 45-47.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 47.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Lansco v. Department of Environmental Resources, 350 A.2d 520, 523-26 (N.J.
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waste statute, unlike the similar statutes in California and Pennsylvania,
imposes strict abatement liability upon persons who have discharged,
or who are responsible for, hazardous waste, 94 rather than upon lan-
downers per se. 9 1 The issue in the New Jersey cases, then, is whether
an innocent landowner is a responsible party within the meaning of
the statute. To date, the New Jersey courts have resolved this issue
in favor of the innocent landowner. 96
An early New Jersey case concerning the statutory abatement liability
of land owners, Lansco v. Department of Environmental Resources,'97
involved the liability of Lansco, a corporation that maintained tanks
for the storage of asphaltic oil."8s An unknown person opened valves
on the tanks one night, allowing oil to spill into the Hackensack
River.' 99 A state agency"' informed Lansco that the corporation was
required to clean the spill as a responsible person within the meaning
of the pollution abatement statute. 20 ' When Lansco sued for a
declaratory judgement,0 2 the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery
Division, held Lansco strictly liable, not as a landowner, but because
Lansco, by storing oil on the land, had engaged in conduct that created
the risk of oil spillage. 2 3 Thus, the company was liable when the
event at risk occurred.20 4
The same court decided Department of Environmental Resources
v. Exxon,2 °5 in which a state agency206 sought to impose abatement
liability on a landowner for spilled oil under the same statute that
was involved in Lansco.20 7 The landowner, a manufacturer 20  had
purchased the land from Exxon Oil Co., which had spilled large quan-
Super. 1975); Exxon v. Hunt, 376 A.2d 1339, 1348-49 (N.J. Super. 1977); Environmental Pro-
tection Department v. Ventron, 440 A.2d 455, 463-64 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1981), aff'd 463 A.2d
893, 900-03 (N.J. 1983). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 197-227 and accompany-
ing text.
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. §58:10-23.llg(b),(c).
195. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 197-227 and accompanying text.
197. 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. 1975).
198. Id. at 521.
199. Id.
200. The state agency was the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. Id.
at 522.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 523.
203. Id. at 523-26.
204. Id. at 526.
205. 376 A.2d 1339 (N.J. Super. 1977).
206. The state agency again was the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
Id. at 1341.
207. NEw JERsEY STAT. ANN. §58:10-23.3(c).
208. Exxon, 376 A.2d at 1341-42.
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tities of oil on the ground.2 °9 The court refused to hold the owner
liable, finding that the waste statute required an affirmative accep-
tance of the condition by the subsequent purchaser before respon-
sibility attached.2"' Since the manufacturer did not engage in activity
resulting in an affirmative acceptance of the condition, no liability
could be imposed.2" The state could not maintain a common law
public nuisance action against the landowner for the same reason.21 2
Thus, the Exxon and Lansco cases demonstrate that, under New Jersey
law, an innocent landowner cannot be required to abate hazardous
waste absent a showing that the landowner affirmatively helped to
create or maintain the nuisance.
Another significant New Jersey case is Environmental Protection
Department v. Ventron.2" 3 For many years the owners of a mercury
processing plant dumped waste on the plant site and in adjacent waters,
producing the worst known freshwater mercury contamination in the
world. 21  A real estate developer bought the site, unaware of the
pollution. 215 The appellate court found that the developer could not
be held answerable for the abatement of the pollution on the basis
of land ownership alone under either the common law or the statute. 21 6
The court stated that before liability could attach, the developer would
have to contribute to the pollution by an affirmative act.21 7 The former
mercury processors, on the other hand, were liable for abatement of
the pollution under the statute because of conduct in creating the waste
site.21 8
Upon appeal by the mercury processor, the state supreme court
affirmed the lower court decision.21 9 The issue of innocent owner
liability was not before the supreme court because the state agency
did not appeal the decision of the lower court that the developer was
not liable.220 Nonetheless, the supreme court decision is instructive,
because the court affirmed the grounds upon which the lower court
decision was based. 22' Thus, the court indicated that ownership of
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1346-47.
211. Id..
212. Id. at 1348-50.
213. 440 A.2d 455 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1981), aff'd 463 A.2d 893 (N.J. 1983).
214. Id. at 458-59.
215. Id. at 464.
216. Id. at 463-64.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 459.
219. Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 463 A.2d 893, 909 (N.J. 1983).
220. Id. at 903.
221. Id. at 900-03.
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land alone is insufficient to trigger abatement liability for hazardous
waste sites. 222
In summary, under New Jersey law, landowner abatement liability
for hazardous waste cannot be based solely upon ownership of polluted
land.223 Instead, the New Jersey courts have required conduct on the
part of the landowner to justify the imposition of abatement liability. 22
This requirement exists under both the statutory and common law
of New Jersey225 and is consistent with the holding in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court case National Wood Preservers as explained by the
concurring opinion in that case. 226 At least one federal court, however,
in considering the hazardous waste abatement liability of innocent
landowners under federal statutes, has reached a contrary result, finding
that landowners can be held responsible for cleaning waste sites despite
the lack of affirmative conduct in creating or maintaining the waste
site.227
3. Federal Cases
In United States v. Price,228 the EPA sought to apply the immi-
nent hazard provision of RCRA229 to purchasers of an existing hazar-
dous waste site.230 The landowners moved for summary judgement,
arguing that the provision was inapplicable to persons who did not
actually create the waste site.23 ' In denying the motion, the district
court held that subsequent purchasers who did nothing to create a
waste site could nonetheless be held liable for abatement costs under
the statute simply by "virtue of their studied indifference to the hazar-
dous condition. ' 23 2 The court further stated that ownership of land
carries liability for conditions on the land.233 In spite of the lack of
222. Id. at 908 (the court did note, however, that ownership and control of land at the
time of the dumping will result in liability if the landowner has the opportunity to prevent
the dumping and fails to do so).
223. See Lansco v. Department of Environmental Protection, 350 A.2d 520, 523-26 (N.J.
Super. 1975); Department of Environmental Protection v. Exxon, 376 A.2d 1339, 1348.49
(N.J. Super. 1977); Environmental Protection Department v. Ventron, 440 A.2d 455, 463-64
(N.J. Super. A.D. 1981), aff'd 463 A.2d 893 (N.J. 1983).
224. See supra notes 197-222 and accompanying text.
225. Id.
226. National Wood Preservers, 414 A.2d 37, 47-48 (Pa. 1980). For a discussion of this
case, see supra notes 162-81 and accompanying text.
227. 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1073-74 (D.N.J. 1981).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1073.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1073-74.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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affirmative conduct in adding to or maintaining the waste site, the
court suggested that other conduct of the purchasers justified impos-
ing liability.234 The court noted that the purchasers were sophisticated
investors. 235 Thus, the purchasers were under a duty to investigate
conditions on the land, and by failing to investigate and to take action
to abate the nuisance,2 36 the purchasers had become liable under the
statute.2
37
Other federal cases involving hazardous waste have failed to deter-
mine the abatement liability of innocent landowners. In City of
Philadelphia v. Stephan Chemical Co. ,238 for instance, a disposer
illegally dumped hazardous wastes in a city landfill. 239 Without deter-
mining the abatement liability of the city, the court held that possi-
ble city liability under the abatement provisions of CERCLA24 ° did
not prevent the city from maintaining the action for costs against
the generator of the wastes.2  Although the issue was not decided
in Stephan Chemical, the case indicates that innocent landowners may
be held liable for waste abatement in federal courts.
Federal law, under the Price holding, allows innocent landowners
to be held strictly liable for the abatement of hazardous waste sites. 242
The precedential value of this decision is slight, however, because the
defendants failed to argue that imposing hazardous waste abatement
liability upon persons who did not create or maintain the the waste
site is contrary to the law of nuisance. 2 3 More importantly, the defen-
dants failed to claim that imposing this liability upon innocent land-
owners was unconstitutionally oppressive.2 4 Finally, Price imposes the
broadest abatement liability yet applied in a federal court.24 5 Whether
other federal courts similarly will impose this abatement liability is
uncertain.246
The federal decisions in Price and Stephan Chemical clearly con-





238. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
239. Id. at 1139.
240. Id. at 1141.
241. Id. at 1142-43.
242. Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1073-74.
243. Id. at 1069.
244. Id. at 1073.
245. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
837 (E.D. Conn. 1984).
246. Id.
247. See supra notes 167-227 and accompanying text.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
imposition of innocent landowner abatement liability in hazardous
waste cases to be unconstitutionally oppressive.248 To help resolve this
conflict, a discussion of appropriate standards for determining land-
owner liability in hazardous waste cases will follow.
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS FOR LANDOWNER ABATEMENT LIABILITY
IN HAZARDous WASTE CASES
Constitutional challenges to statutes requiring landowners to abate
hazardous waste have centered on the second prong of the test
announced in Lawton v. Steele.24 9 This part of the test requires the
state action to be reasonably related to the state purpose without being
unduly oppressive upon individuals.25 Under Penn Central,"'
oppressiveness can be determined by measuring the financial impact
of the state action upon the individual.252 While this consideration
has application in hazardous waste cases,253 courts that have rejected
the imposition of liability upon innocent landowners have focused
on the absence of affirmative conduct by the landowner as the decisive
factor in determining oppressiveness. 25 This concentration upon con-
duct is unsurprising because the striking feature of these hazardous
waste cases is the imposition of liability upon individuals who did
nothing to justify the imposition of liability. Since the land of these
individuals has become polluted through the acts of others, the land-
owner is a victim rather than a culprit. Yet, under the statutes, the
landowner is treated the same as a party who created the waste site. 2"1
Nonetheless, the state courts have recognized the innocence of the
landowner, as demonstrated by the lack of affirmative conduct in
creating or maintaining the waste site, 256 as justification for refusing
to impose abatement liability.257 The courts, therefore, hold that lia-
bility for hazardous waste site abatement in the absence of acts
associating the landowner with the waste site is either not within the
scope of the statute25 8 or is oppressive under the Lawton test.2"9
248. Id.
249. 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
250. Id.
251. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
252. Id. at 124.
253. See supra notes 37-87 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 67-248 and accompanying text.
255. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFrTY CODE §25187.5(c); 42 U.S.C. §6973(a); 42 U.S.C. §9607(a);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 21E.
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The refusal to allow hazardous waste abatement liability to be based
solely upon land ownership is also supported by the law of public
nuisance.2 60 The decisions of state courts in hazardous waste cases
clearly have recognized that abatement liability for public nuisances
cannot arise from land ownership alone. 6' Although California public
nuisance cases have imposed abatement liability based upon land
ownership alone, 262 these cases also hold that the resulting costs to
the landowner must be reasonable. 263 The imposition of hazardous
waste abatement liability would seem to fall outside this rule because
this imposition would subject the landowner to unreasonable expense.261
A third reason for refusing to impose liability based upon land
ownership alone is found in the doctrine of strict liability. 265 Statutes
imposing hazardous waste abatement, in addition to holding land-
owners responsible for waste abatement, impose strict liability upon
parties responsible for the existence of waste sites.26  The imposition
of liability upon parties who created the waste site is in accordance
with strict liability doctrine, under which liability is imposed for harms
resulting from deliberate conduct in carrying out dangerous activity.267
In the case of innocent landowners, however, the application of strict
liability is inappropriate because the owner has not engaged in con-
duct justifying the imposition of strict liability.268
For these reasons, an owner who did not create or maintain a hazar-
dous waste site should not be liable for abatement costs. Conversely,
a landowner who did help to create the waste site is liable under the
law of nuisance and strict liability doctrine. Furthermore, because of
this liability, these persons do not have the constitutional objections
that innocent owners have to the imposition of waste abatement lia-
bility. Some basis is needed, however, for separating innocent land-
owners from non-innocent owners.269
260. See supra notes 120-66 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 167-227 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 37-87 and accompanying text.
265. See W. PROSSER, Law of Torts, §75 at 494-95 (4th ed. 1971). This doctrine imposes
liability for harms resulting from hazardous activity without regard to the care exercised by
the individual in carrying out the activity. Id.
266. E.g. Exxon v. Hunt, 376 A.2d 1339, 1344-45 (N.J. Super. 1977).
267. Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 463 A.2d 893, 900-03 (N.J. 1983).
268. See United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1066-73 (1981).
269. E.g. Exxon v. Hunt, 376 A.2d 1339, 1344-45 (N.J. Super. 1977).
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JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING HAZARDOUS
WASTE ABATEMENT LIABILTY
State courts considering the hazardous waste liability of innocent
landowners have held that this liability may not be imposed unless
the landowner has helped to create or maintain the waste site.27° The
courts following this standard recognize that hazardous waste abate-
ment cannot be triggered by land ownership alone."7 ' In cases involv-
ing this liability, then, the issue becomes whether the conduct of the
owner was sufficient to justify imposing this liability. This question
will be readily resolved against landowners who participate in creating
or maintaining a waste site by activity such as running a landfill opera-
tion and accepting hazardous waste for disposal.272 Conversely, owners
without contemporaneous knowledge of the dumping, and who do
not thereafter actively maintain the dumpsite, could not be held respon-
sible for abatement costs since these parties have not helped to create
or maintain the waste site. 73 Finally, mere knowledge of the waste
site would not justify liability. 74
Hazardous waste abatement regulations, also must be focused upon
the conduct of the parties who create waste sites in order to be con-
stitutional. Statutes that impose hazardous waste abatement liability
on the basis of land ownership alone can be modified without great
difficulty, because these statutes generally also impose liability upon
parties who created the waste site.2 75 The California statute, for in-
stance, states that "present and prior owners, lessees, or operators
of the property where hazardous waste is located, and producers,
transporters, or disposers of the hazardous waste" are responsible
for the costs of abating the waste site. 76 Of these parties, liability
is imposed upon "producers, transporters or disposers of the waste,"
and "operators of the property," for conduct that results in the crea-
tion or maintenance of a waste site. In contrast, the statutory
imposition of liability upon "present and prior owners, and lessees,"
allows liability to be imposed upon land ownership alone.277 Since
the liability of these parties is not based upon conduct, this portion
270. See supra notes 167-227 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 171-227 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 167-257 and accompanying text.
273. Id.
274. Cf. Price v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1066-73 (D.N.J. 1981).
275. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
276. CAL. HEALTH & SA Yan CODE §§25187, 25187.5.
277. Id. at §§25187, 25187.5
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of the statute should be excised to be consistent with the Constitu-
tion. The liability of non-innocent owners would remain intact under
the statute, since by virtue of their conduct these parties could be
held liable either as operators of the property278 or as disposers of
waste. 27 To avoid confusion, the definitions of these parties could
be altered to include property owners who allow dumping of hazar-
dous waste on their land.
CONCLUSION
State and federal statutes presently impose strict liability on land-
owners for abating hazardous waste on their land. Since the land-
owner need not have participated in creating or maintaining the waste
site, this liability is based upon nothing more than ownership. Im-
posing liability on individuals for waste dumped on their land by others
without permission violates the policy of imposing liability only upon
those who cause harm. This amounts to a requirement that the land-
owner pay for a public benefit.
Imposing this liability on innocent landowners runs counter to the
constitutional guarantee that land cannot be taken for a public pur-
pose without just compensation. The United States Supreme Court
has held that an unconstitutional exercise of the police power occurs
when the means used in a statute affecting property rights are not
reasonably related to the purpose of the statute or are unduly
oppressive upon the individual. Hazardous waste statutes that impose
abatement liability on the basis of land ownership require the individual
to pay the cost of a public benefit. If the property owner did not
create the harm the state seeks to correct, then the state is taking
property without due process of law. Liability for hazardous waste
sites, therefore, should be limited to the parties creating or maintain-
ing the site.
Ken Purviance
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